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CAN THE LAW

BE

COPYRIGHTED?-

FIFrH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT MODEL
BUILDING CODES LOSE COPYRIGHTS

UPON ADOPTION INTO LAW-

VEECK v.

SBCCI

Maryjane Boone Bonfield*
ELL established law deems judicial opinions and statutes to be
within the public domain and, therefore, not subject to copyrights.1 The question remains, however, whether this principle
likewise covers "state-promulgated administrative regulations" modeled
on a privately developed, copyrighted code. 2 Because the Supreme Court
has not considered such a case in which the author asserted a proprietary
interest in material adopted by the government as law, the issue appears
to be one of first impression at the circuit level. 3 While the First, Second,
and Ninth Circuits correctly have declined to enjoin enforcement of private copyrights in these circumstances, 4 the Fifth Circuit did not do so in
Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc. 5 Rather, in
the absence of express congressional guidance or directly controlling Supreme Court precedent, the Fifth Circuit overstepped its bounds in determining that the entirety of a privately created model code, access to
which had been denied to no one, should lose its copyright protection in
toto, solely by virtue of its enactment into law. 6 No justification for such
loss of protection exists.
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law;
B.A., 2000, Vanderbilt University.
1. See Bldg. Officials & Code Admin. (BOCA) v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 734

(1st Cir. 1980).
2. Id.
3. Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1997);
BOCA, 628 F.2d at 734.
4. Practice Mgmt., 121 F.3d at 519 (holding that a federal agency's adoption of a work
as the standard in preparation of Medicare and Medicaid claims did not render a copyright
invalid); BOCA, 628 F.2d at 730 (refrained from holding a copyright on a privately created
building code adopted by the state invalid); CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt.
Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 72 (2d Cir. 1994) (declining to invalidate the copyright on a
privately prepared listing of automobile values that several states required insurance com-

panies to use in calculating insurance awards).
5. Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002).
6. Id. at 812 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
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Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc. ("SBCCI") is a
non-profit organization whose primary mission has been to develop, promote, and promulgate building codes. 7 It encourages local government
entities to enact its codes into law, without cost to the governmental entity.8 While SBCCI continues to assert its copyright prerogatives, even as
to codes that have been adopted by local entities, the organization allows
the public to view and copy codes on display at government offices. 9
Peter Veeck operates a non-commercial website that provides information about North Texas.10 In 1997, Veeck decided to post the local building codes of Anna and Savoy, two towns that had adopted model codes
written by SBCCI.II Unable to locate the building codes easily, Veeck
purchased copies on a copyrighted disk directly from SBCCI and proceeded to cut and paste the exact SBCCI text onto his website.' 2
Upon receiving demands to desist copyright infringement from SBCCI,
Veeck refused to do so and filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a
ruling that he did not violate the Copyright Act by posting a copy of the
municipal building codes on his website. 13 SBCCI counterclaimed for
copyright infringement, among other claims. 14 The district court granted
summary judgment for SBCCI finding that it did own valid copyrights in
the building codes. 15 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld SBCCI's copyrights in the municipal building codes and rejected Veeck's defenses to
infringement based on due process, merger, fair use, misuse, and
waiver. 16 The Fifth Circuit elected to rehear the case en banc because of
the "novelty and importance" of the issues presented by the case.' 7 After
an en banc hearing, the Fifth Circuit reversed its original holding.' 8
Writing for the court of appeals, Judge Edith Jones stated that, as the
author of an original work, SBCCI indisputably held a copyright in its
model building codes before they were adopted into law. 19 Under copyright law, SBCCI had the right to exclusively make or condone derivative
works and to regulate the copying and distribution of both the original
and derivative works.20 The Fifth Circuit needed to determine, however,
whether SBCCI retained the right wholly to exclude others from copying
7. Id. at 793.

8. Id. at 794.
9. Id.

10. Id. at 793.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 794.
14. Id.

15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 791.
19. Id. at 794; see Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1995) (stating that "copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible means of expression").

20. Veeck, 293 F.3d at 794; see Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1995) (articulat-

ing the exclusive rights protected in copyrighted works).
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the building codes after they had been adopted into the law of various
2
jurisdictions. 1
According to the Fifth Circuit, SBCCI did not retain copyrights over
model codes after they have been incorporated into law. 22 Looking to

Supreme Court precedent, the court interpreted a line of cases suggesting
that the citizens are the true authors and owners of the law regardless of
who actually drafts the provisions. In this way, the law inherently fell
within the public domain and could not be subject to the Copyright Act. 23
In light of the Copyright Act limitation, even in the event that the law of
municipalities could be copyrighted, the court found building codes to be
"facts" within the meaning of the merger doctrine and, thereby, excluded
from the Copyright Act. 24 The court also distinguished this case in noting
that the building codes were wholly adopted into the actual text of the
law rather than merely referenced by statute. 25 Finally, the Fifth Circuit
attempted to absolve any concerns as to the elimination of author incen26
tives in the event law is deemed uncopyrightable.
Judge Higginbotham wrote a short dissent supported by three judges in
which he pointed out the availability of the building codes to the public,
distinguished Supreme Court precedent from this case, and looked to
27
public policy over the merger doctrine.
A more thorough dissent, written by Judge Weiner and supported by
five judges, opposed the majority's per se rule that once a copyrighted
work is enacted into law, it loses its entire copyright protection, ipso
facto, regardless of the nature of the author, the character of the work, or
the relationship of the copier to the work. 28 The dissent based its opinion
primarily on an absence of controlling legal authority as well as public
policy clearly supporting copyright protection for privately created works
adopted into law. 29 The court also declined to apply the merger doctrine
where public policy does not demand it and where more than one means
of expression exists. 30 Finally, the dissent refuted all affirmative defense

31
arguments: free speech, misuse, waiver, and fair use.
The Fifth Circuit incorrectly interpreted Supreme Court precedent as a
per se rule refusing copyright protection for all law regardless of the circumstances; it incorrectly defined building codes as "facts" excluded from
copyright protection; it incorrectly applied the merger doctrine by diminishing public policy concerns; and it incorrectly distinguished building

21. Veeck, 293 F.3d at 794.

22. Id. at 791.
23. Id. at 799.
24. Id. at 800.
25.
26.
options
27.

Veeck, 293 F.3d at 804.
Id. at 804-05 (finding the following additional incentives for authors: self-interest,
to publish and sell value-added compilations of law).
Id. at 806-07.

28. Id. at 810.
29. See Veeck, 293 F.3d at 810-18.
30. See id. at 819-20.
31. Id. at 820-24.
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codes fully adopted into law from standards referenced by law. 32
First, the majority opinion mischaracterized the SBCCI model building
codes as "fact." A fundamental copyright principle is that only the expression of an "idea" or "fact," and not the "idea" or "fact" itself, is protectable. 33 Thus, should the majority be correct in finding the code to be
"fact" upon its adoption into law, it would also be correct in denying copyright protection. The absence of express support in Supreme Court precedent, statutes, and analogous cases denies, by implication, that a code
adopted into law automatically becomes "fact" or "idea."
While Supreme Court precedent does restrict copyright protection for
statutes and judicial opinions, it bases its opinions on author incentives
and public policy issues rather than the more obvious fact/expression dichotomy. 34 Why would the Supreme Court look to more tangential factors over the more obvious and central reason for restricting copyright
protection: that "fact" is not protected by the Copyright Act? Statutes
and judicial opinions may not necessarily be "fact" by virtue of being
enacted into law. By failing to address the obvious limits on copyright
protection, the Supreme Court implicitly suggests that the laws at issue
were not "fact" and not excluded from protection. If a judicial opinion
created by a government official and applied according to its specific
phrasing is not "fact," then a model building code, created by a private
party and not applied according to its specific phrasing but according to
its overall concepts, is not "fact" either.
Furthermore, analogous case law does address the fact/expression dichotomy. 35 No case dealing with privately created works adopted by law,
however, has ever found such works to be "fact" and subsequently excluded from copyright protection. 36 Again, by implication, one would assume that adoption into law does not render a work as "fact."
Looking to the Copyright Act itself, works of the federal government
specifically have been excluded from copyright. 37 In turn, the Act seems
to allow copyrights for such works of state and local governments by not
specifically excluding them. Why would the Act allow the possibility of
32. See id. at 793-806.
33. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991); see Copyright Act of
1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1995) (stating that "in no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work").
34. See Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888) (holding that law authorizing an
official reporter for the Ohio Supreme Court to obtain a copyright on the opinions of the
court to be invalid where judges are paid by the public and where the public retains the
right to free access); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834).
35. CCC Info. Servs., 44 F.3d at 61; Practice Mgmt., 121 F.3d at 516; BOCA, 628 F.2d
at 730.
36. See CCC Info. Servs., 44 F.3d at 61; Practice Mgmt., 121 F.3d at 516; BOCA, 628
F.2d at 730.
37. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1995) (stating that "copyright protection
under this title is not available for any work of the United States government, but the
United States government is not precluded from receiving and holding copyrights transferred to it by assignment, bequest, or otherwise").
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copyrights on state laws if all law is excludable as "fact"? It would not.
Thus, laws are not inherently "fact." In light of these reasons, the court
cannot definitively state that the municipal codes are "fact" without giving some sort of supporting rational-which it has not done.
Second, the automatic application of the merger doctrine by the majority ignored essential public policy considerations. While the municipal
codes do not appear to be "fact" in and of themselves, neither do they
appear to "merge" into "fact" upon adoption into law. The merger doctrine arises out of the courts' difficulty in locating the precise boundary
between fact and expression. 38 It states that when the expression of a fact
is inseparable from the fact itself, the expression and fact merge. Such a
merger occurs where only one means of expressing a fact exists such that
protection of the expression would effectively confer a monopoly of the
fact upon the copyright owner. 39 Thus, upon merging with a "fact," the
expression no longer retains its copyright.
Though seemingly simple, determining when the fact and its expression
have merged is a task requiring considerable care: if the merger doctrine
is applied too readily, arguably available alternative forms of expression
will be precluded; if applied too sparingly, protection will be accorded to
facts. Recognizing this tension, courts have been cautious in applying the
merger doctrine to selections of factual information. 40 A court's decision
whether to apply the merger doctrine often depends on how it defines the
author's idea. 4' For this reason, the guiding consideration in drawing the
line is public policy, including the preservation of the balance between
42
competition and protection reflected in copyright laws.

The majority opinion carelessly dismissed public policy considerations
in determining whether to apply the merger doctrine, stating that where
the idea/expression dichotomy is "clear cut," public policies need not be
addressed. But the idea/expression dichotomy was not "clear cut" in this
case or in any cases for that matter. Judge Learned Hand went as far as
to say that "nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary [between
idea and expression], and nobody ever can."'43 Thus, public policy considerations must be weighed in determining whether to apply the merger
doctrine. In turn, as articulated in the dissent, public policy weighs
against the application of the merger doctrine because the consequences
38. Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458, 1463 (5th Cir.
1990).
39. See Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 141 (5th Cir. 1992); Kregos,
937 F.2d at 705; Kern, 899 F.2d at 1463.
40. Kregos, 937 F.2d at 705.
41. Mason, 967 F.2d at 140.
42. Id.; see also CCC Info. Servs., 44 F.3d at 72 n.25 (quoting Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971)); MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[F] at 13-128 (1994) (discussing the
merger doctrine, Nimmer points out that "this line [for determining when an idea has become sufficiently delineated to warrant copyright protection] is a pragmatic one, drawn not
on the basis of some metaphysical property of 'ideas,' but by balancing the need to protect
the labors of authors with the desire to assure free access to ideas").
43. Veeck, 293 F.3d at 820.
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of giving the benefit of the merger doctrine are too destructive to the
intended protection of the Copyright Act without giving sufficient benefit
to the preservation of public access to facts. 44 The merger doctrine does
not apply.
Furthermore, the majority's distinction between "model codes"
adopted in whole and "standards" adopted by reference is wrong. Two
analogous cases decided by the Second and Ninth Circuits decline to exclude privately created works adopted by law from copyright protection. 45 The majority attempted to distinguish the cases by noting that
they involved mere references within the law rather than wholesale adoption of a standard into the law's text. 46 This distinction, however, is not
viable. If a citizen must refer to a set of standards referred to by the
written text of the law to have notice of the government's expectations
for their actions, those standards are law. They are no different than
model codes published within the law itself. Thus, the refusal of the Second and Ninth Circuits to enjoin copyright protection for privately created works adopted into law has weight in Veeck.
As already stated, the question of whether a work created and copyrighted by a private interest group loses its copyright upon being adopted
into law is one of first impression at the circuit level. The Fifth Circuit,
however, denied copyright protection in such a way as to fly in the face of
Supreme Court precedent and the balance of analogous case law. By
mischaracterizing the Copyright Act and the scope of its protection, the
Fifth Circuit's holding in Veeck will create a ripple effect throughout the
U.S. judicial system. Before Veeck, the circuit courts remained united in
their refusal to deny copyright protection. The Fifth Circuit's decision in
Veeck, however, created a split that only the Supreme Court can resolve.
Not only is the question one of first impression, but it is a question of
great importance in view of a possible trend towards state and federal
adoption of model codes. 47 The complexities of modern life and the
breadth of problems addressed by government entities necessitate continuous participation by private experts and interest groups in all aspects of
statutory and regulatory lawmaking. 48 The groups often relieve the government from the physical and economic burdens of lawmaking. By denying copyright protection, the Fifth Circuit removes the economic
incentives motivating many of these private interest groups. In turn, it
essentially declines future benefits for the government. Without private
help, the government will not be able to meet the statutory needs of a
modern, technological culture and American citizens will suffer. The
Fifth Circuit not only reaches an incorrect conclusion based on law, but
points the way towards the demise of the U.S. statutory arena.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

CCC Info Servs., 44 F.3d at 72.
See Practice Mgmt., 121 F.3d at 516; CCC Info. Servs., 44 F.3d at 61.
See Veeck, 293 F.3d at 803-05.
BOCA, 628 F.2d at 736.
Veeck, 293 F.3d at 798.

